This bestselling book by economists Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson develops a conceptual foundation for analyzing the creation and consolidation of democracy. The authors begin with the seemingly simple premise that different social groups prefer different political institutions based on how they distribute political power and resources. Thus, democracy is preferred by the majority of citizens, but resisted by elites. However, dictatorship is unstable when citizens can pose a threat of social unrest and revolution. In response, when the cost of repression is significantly high and promises of concessions lack credibility, elites may be forced to create democracy. Through democratization, elites credibly transfer political power to citizens, ensuring social stability. Democracy consolidates when elites lack strong incentives to overthrow it. These processes depend on the strength of civil society, the structure of political institutions, the nature of political and economic crises, the level of economic inequality, the structure of the economy, and the form and extent of globalization.